There is considerable demand from practitioners for policy advice on which TJ mechanisms should be funded and how they should be designed, and scholars have a responsibility to ensure that advice given is justified by the
available evidence. But to do this, we have to understand what the evidence is, and why studies appear either to be contradictory or to talk past one another.
I use a broad sample of literature evaluating the TJ programme in Sierra Leone to illustrate my argument. Sierra Leone was chosen as an exemplar from a univariate class (states in which TJ programmes have been carried out) with attention paid to choosing a case in which there is a significant volume of relevant literature to analyze, and in which sufficient time has passed for conclusions to coalesce around particular value orientations. Sierra Leone is both generally representative of the class of cases (in the strict sense that it has had a TJ programme), while being, like all other TJ cases, distinctive. The question of whether my argument is generalizable to alternative cases is therefore an empirical one, but there is nothing inherent to the Sierra Leone case to suggest that the array of positions evident in scholarship would not be found for other TJ programmes.
The literature sample I examine in the article is not formally representative, as the concern is to explore the types of evaluative claims made rather than their frequency. The sample does, however, represent a wide range of work on Sierra Leonean TJ, drawn from a variety of disciplinary and professional perspectives, selected to represent as faithfully as possible the number of value orientations which exist in the field. It is mostly scholarly 
[A]CHALLENGES OF EVALUATION
TJ is a burgeoning field -ploughing forward in practice but dogged by disagreements and controversies within conceptual and empirical studies of its nature and effects. Christine Bell notes that there is significant unease around what the field's goals are and should be, and whether and when the practice is 'good' (an extension of human rights discourse, or necessary to democratization or peace), 'bad' (imperialist, hegemonic, impunity serving or promoting a dangerous legal exceptionalism) or a value-neutral tool with which both 'good' and 'bad' goals can be pursued. 6 This confusion arises partly because TJ is not a coherent field, but rather a term encompassing three potentially conflicting conceptions:
an ongoing battle against impunity rooted in human rights discourse; a set of conflict resolution techniques related to constitution making; and a tool for international statebuilding in the aftermath of mass atrocity. 7 This lack of agreement on what TJ means is prevalent in both the general and casebased literature. Recent large-n studies exemplify the disagreements. Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, for instance, map the effects of human rights prosecutions and truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) on human rights protections and on deterrence of atrocity crimes (both of which they show to be positively correlated to the existence of TJ mechanisms).
8 This is in contrast to Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, who focus on TJ as a conflict resolution technique and suggest that amnesties are better able to guarantee durable peace than trials (in addition arguing that war crimes trials do little to deter atrocity crimes). 26 In order to understand contradictory or incomparable evaluations, a framework of value positions is outlined below into which research on TJ in Sierra Leone can be positioned.
Such a framework is not intended to adjudicate between different approaches to TJ (there is no correct value position from which to appraise TJ), but can help to understand why appraisals differ and how to evaluate the evaluators. Very Idea of Pure Procedural Justice,' Ethics 90(4) (1980): 502-511), and it is possible (though less common in the literature) to evaluate truth commissions, reparations programmes and so on according to the fairness of their procedures rather than the fairness of their outcomes. Dancy, supra n 1, separates TJ evaluations into those concerned with process and those concerned with outcomes. However, prior value positions have been taken in the work he cites as to what just processes would consist of, meaning these positions fit relatively unproblematically into the framework discussed here without the need for a separate category. 30 Teitel, supra n 28. 31 Bell, supra n 1 at 22. 32 Teitel, supra n 28. The mechanisms of justice do tend to differ according to the conception of justice driving the TJ programme. For instance, trials are the gold standard of retributive justice and truth commissions tend to be seen as delivering restorative justice, but there is no logically necessary relationship between conception of justice and mechanism. Trials are also claimed to deliver some forms of truth, and truth commissions can be retributive. conception of justice, rather than mapping across all three conceptions, and secondly, it is possible to be an expressivist -to hold that trials, convictions and punishment carry important expressive qualities -while also valuing justice intrinsically and/or for its consequences.
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Justice can be valued intrinsically in all three conceptions, though intrinsic positions are more prevalent for those who hold a retributive conception. Retributivism (i.e., the valuing of retributive justice for its intrinsic properties) holds that justice is a matter of moral desertpeople who commit wrongful acts deserve a proportionate punishment. Impunity, or the failure to administer retributive justice, is a moral wrong. The administering of punishment, in this view, is good in itself, without reference to the consequences of the punishment. It also follows from this view that the punishment of innocent individuals is wrong, no matter what the consequences. 39 In terms of evaluating transitional justice, a retributivist would favour TJ programmes in which criminal trials took place, guilty verdicts were rendered and sentences passed.
It is also relatively common to see retributive justice justified according to its instrumental value -its tendency to bring about good consequences. In terms of TJ evaluation, such good consequences might include deterrence, the incapacitation of certain actors and (though far less frequently in international justice) rehabilitation. They also include the spread of the rule of law. They would not, on this view, include truth or peace, which are seen as more likely good consequences of restorative justice.
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Restorative justice is often valued for its consequences rather than for its intrinsic properties, but one can nevertheless find some examples of the latter. While it would be unusual to find a restorative justice approach which does not see some intrinsic (moral) value in restoring the dignity of victims, most of these approaches also emphasize the consequences of doing justice. These consequences might include the resolution of conflict, the provision of 'truth,' particularly about the root causes of conflict, and 'reconciliation' at the individual or societal level. They might also include restitution of those harmed (via a reparations programme), building stable state institutions, promoting liberal values and, perhaps counterintuitively, supporting the rule of law through amnesty rather than trials. 41 Like restorative justice, transformative justice is most likely to be valued principally for its results, that is, for the extent to which it brings about transformation. Such transformation includes consequences which tend to be overlooked by other approaches -in particular challenges to gendered structures of power (a more far-reaching goal than just the participation of women in a justice process), the healing of trauma, and economic transformation or development. 42 However, Lambourne implies that context-sensitivity is of intrinsic value within this approach. 43 Paul Gready and Simon Robins' 'bottom-up' approach also sees intrinsic value in the processes of justice:
transformative justice is not the result of a top-down imposition of external legal frameworks or institutional templates, but of a more bottom-up understanding and analysis of the lives and needs of populations.
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This is not just a claim about the justice of procedures, but an assertion that justice cannot truly be done if it is imposed from the outside.
There are six possible value positions suggested by the foregoing analysis -valuing each of retributive, restorative and transformative justice for its intrinsic or instrumental value.
These positions are analogous to ideal types, in that the differences between them are amplified in order to better understand the value orientations which lie behind scholarship (notwithstanding that value orientations are abstract rather than empirically observable). Also analogous to inquiry using ideal types, few examples of TJ appraisals sit squarely within any one category. However, most tend towards one or two of them and examples of features of value orientations which don't 'fit' into the categories are instructive in and of themselves.
[A]EVALUATING TJ IN SIERRA LEONE
In the following sections a selection of work appraising the TJ programme in Sierra Leone is discussed in terms of the six categories outlined above. The article concludes by considering what can be learned about TJ evaluation by doing so.
[B]Retributive Justice for Its Intrinsic Value
International institutions, justice practitioners and lawyers often praise or criticize the TJ programme in Sierra Leone with reference to impunity. For instance, the UNSC has commended the Special Court for 'strengthening stability in Sierra Leone and the sub-region and bringing an end to impunity.' 45 To have ended impunity successfully, on this account, the retributivist mechanism within the TJ programme, the SCSL, would need to have prosecuted The value of justice in itself might also come from the quality of its processes.
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Evaluations undertaken by lawyers often judge the extent to which TJ processes were inclusive, fair, free from political interference, 50 and observant of the highest legal standards. 49 As noted, procedural quality is not treated here as a separate conception of justice, but as a reason to value justice. 50 Mahony, supra n 47; Mahony and Sooka, supra n 48. 51 Hollis, supra n 46.
form (from both intrinsic and instrumental perspectives) -the first court to conclude a trial against a sitting head of state, the first criminalization of the use of child soldiers and forced marriage, and so on.
The Special Court is the first modern international court located in the country where the prosecuted crimes were committed. It is also the first such tribunal that was created by a bilateral treaty, co-existed with a truth and reconciliation commission, has a farreaching outreach programme, and relies mostly on national staff.
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The background assumptions from an intrinsic orientation are that the quality of justice is increased by these firsts -that they are a sign of progress. Wayne Jordash and Matthew
Crowe, however, question the quality of the justice processes within the SCSL and express profound concerns over the use of SCSL decisions as a precedent in future trials.
[B]Retributive Justice for Its Instrumental Value
The key consequences claimed in evaluative work tending towards this value orientation concern deterrence and spreading the rule of law. The president of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, David Tolbert, said on the Charles Taylor trial:
The SCSL's judgment has…provided a strong signal to those who want to commit horrific crimes though surrogates and puppets: they may not easily hide behind complicated legal constructs and are more certain to face the bar of justice.
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The UNSC commends the Court for 'contributing to the restoration of the rule of law Deterrence claims are particularly hard to substantiate and tend to be asserted more than proven within evaluations. 56 Rule-of-law outcomes are more readily observable. Hollis, for instance, argues that the SCSL contributed to rule-of-law outcomes in the domestic legal system through participation of Sierra Leonean staff in the work of the Court, capacity-building and training programmes, and the creation of the Sierra Leone Legal Information Institute.
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Opposing evaluations note, in contrast, that no one has been prosecuted in the Sierra
Leonean domestic system for war crimes or crimes against humanity committed during the conflict, suggesting a very limited spillover effect.
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Another type of evaluation made in this vein concerns the contributions that courts in particular can make to international jurisprudence. Hollis and Valerie Oosterveld outline the successes of the SCSL in terms of generating jurisprudence that can be used by other international courts on forced marriage, sexual slavery, the use of child soldiers and attacks on peacekeepers. 59 The commendable 'firsts' also feature here -they are claimed to have positive consequences for the international justice project more broadly, as their appearance in Sierra Leone is assumed to make it more likely that they will be possible/built upon elsewhere.
A final focus of evaluation which favours an instrumental retributive conception of justice is the microeconomics of TJ mechanisms. Some work has been done on the cost of retributive justice, the problems of the voluntary contributions funding model of the SCSL, the subjecting of accountability mechanisms to market-based rationality, and the consequences of witness payments at the Court. 64 Mutua, supra n 5 at page 5. Mutua also suggests that public support has good consequences: 'Ultimately, transitional justice processes can become more effective if they are backed by contending political elites and have deep and broad purchase within the general population,' page 7.
Of the groups listed, women play probably the most significant role in evaluations of TJ processes. Until recently, women's participation in TJ (in positions of authority within justice mechanisms as well as in their capacity as victims) has been seen as important in so far as it upholds the moral value of gender equality or inclusivity, as well as the intrinsic unjustness of excluding women from justice processes, rather than on evidence that such participation leads to valuable consequences. 66 Evaluative work on women's participation in the TJ processes in Sierra Leone follows this pattern: women's participation is assumed to be intrinsically good (and the lack of it bad). The role of consequences is more complex. Binaifer Nowrojee commends the SCSL and the TRC for their gender-sensitive strategies to facilitate women's participation, and predicts positive consequences of these strategies. 67 Like Nowrojee, Kelli
Muddell assumes women's participation to be a necessary factor in justifying justice processes and commends the SCSL and the TRC for unusually gender-inclusive practices and also for positive consequences flowing from these practices. 68 However, these positions value justice principally for its intrinsic value -the claimed consequences are suggested more than matter of justice even if good consequences cannot be demonstrated. For instance, Jamesina
King contrasts the relatively extensive participation of women in the peace process, TRC and reparations scheme (which is seen as valuable) with the relatively disappointing consequences of that participation. 69 Michelle Staggs Kelsall and Shanee Stepakoff argue that the SCSL silenced women through its failure to allow particular evidence of sexual violence, and that this silencing was both indicative of systemic biases against victim-witnesses in the Court and had deleterious consequences for the individual women involved. 70 There is, once again, little agreement to be found within scholarship from this perspective.
Research tending towards this orientation also values public engagement with the TJ process more generally, often highlighting its importance both intrinsically and because of its potential consequences. The UNSG argues that 'the most successful transitional justice experiences owe a large part of their success to the quantity and quality of public and victim consultation carried out. Local consultation enables a better understanding of the dynamics of past conflict, patterns of discrimination and types of victims,' citing Sierra Leone as an example
of a more open and consultative trend. 71 Conversely, Gearoid Millar observes that the Sierra Leonean and western conceptions of truth and the power of God in the healing process were so different that many Sierra Leoneans saw the TRC as redundant. 72 Rosalind Shaw's research also highlights the importance of TJ resonating with the public. She argues that the Sierra Leonean public had little interest in the TJ mechanisms, and some groups even organized to prevent public TRC participation, as the truth-telling norms being promoted were in opposition to established communal practices of healing and social coexistence. 73 Justice could not be served, in this view, as the model of justice being promoted did not map onto understandings of justice among the Sierra Leonean public. These lists illustrate some of the tensions within the TJ field -they fail to distinguish between the types of justice which might logically be claimed to bring about the consequences.
Rule of law consequences are claimed to result from retributive justice (dealt with above). The focus in this section is on truth, reconciliation and reparation.
One of the main outcomes examined in evaluative TJ literature is the provision of 'truth.' TRCs and, increasingly, courts are judged on whether they have provided a truthful and authoritative record of a conflict and the crimes that took place within it. This is something the Sierra Leonean TRC is particularly commended for -it published an extremely detailed report, along with a shorter version for secondary schools and another directed at children. truth commission. Kelsall outlines the ways in which the TRC provided sometimes unanticipated reconciliatory moments, through ritual rather than truth seeking. 82 Finally, in this category, are reparations as a consequence of justice. 83 Reparations were probably the aspect of the TJ programme that was most important to most Sierra Leoneans yet there is surprisingly little evaluation of the TJ programme which examines its failure to adequately provide reparations. 84 Evaluations which do consider reparations find the scheme to be wanting, as many people testified at the TRC or the SCSL because they expected it to materially improve their lives in some way (often because they had been led to expect this by community leaders, NGOs or the government). 85 In fact, ex-combatants were aided before victims, and most victims only received US$100. 86 In terms of evaluating the interaction between TJ mechanisms, Clark notes that the SCSL had a negative impact on the reparations process in a number of ways. Most importantly, it is not unreasonable to assume that the cost of the court depleted the international resources available for reparations thus directly detracting from the reparations provided to the Sierra Leonean victims. 87 The SCSL cost around $250 million and was mostly funded through voluntary contributions, but when the reparations fund managers sought voluntary contributions to the reparations programme, they could only raise US$4.4 million.
[B]Transformative Justice for Its Intrinsic Value
Context-sensitivity was argued above to be an intrinsically valuable feature of transformative justice. Research criticizing TJ mechanisms for failing to reflect local political, legal and cultural contexts conceives of justice as intrinsically valuable to the extent to which it is attentive to context. 88 Such literature generally criticizes the top-down nature of global TJ practice, its legalist character and its prioritization of liberal state building and rule-of-law work over the promotion of social and economic rights and individual and societal healing. 89 Justice, in this view, should be locally owned and TJ programmes should engage meaningfully with local institutions and traditions in order to constitute justice in specific contexts. 90 Kelsall claims that transitional justice in Sierra Leone failed to connect with stakeholders or engage Sierra
Leonean culture because the global TJ community attempted to draft in a one-size-fits-all TJ template. 91 Megan MacKenzie and Mohamed Sesay document the power asymmetries which resulted in Sierra Leone having little choice in, or power over, its own TJ process. 92 This type of research often tends towards both intrinsic and instrumental justification, making it hard to fit even approximately into the value positions outlined here. Shaw, for example, maintains that speaking of the war in public in Sierra Leone undermines established processes for healing and reconciliation at the village and familial levels. 93 However, as is the case with research on women's participation, there is a sense in this category that even if good consequences of context-sensitivity cannot be demonstrated, justice processes which reflect local political, legal and cultural contexts are intrinsically valuable.
[B]Transformative Justice for Its Instrumental Value
The key consequences those who favour this position would expect to see are long-term changes in political, social and economic structures. In terms of political structures, William
Schabas judges the TJ programme in Sierra Leone to have struggled because, unlike TJ in South Africa, it was not part of a much broader social transformation, driven by an extremely dynamic civil society…this sad conclusion inevitably limits the potential of the Sierra Leonean TRC to influence the future of this troubled country. 94 The verdict on social structures is often similar. Here, scholars concerned with the gendered dimensions of the TJ programme note that the limited victories for women's rights which were won during TJ have not been translated into the posttransition. 95 The impact of TJ on economic structures is one of the most underresearched aspects of the Sierra Leonean TJ programme, and indeed of TJ programmes more broadly.
Transformative justice advocates note that scholars rarely assess TJ alongside development indicators or attempts to correlate TJ to changes in the protection of socioeconomic rights. By focusing on political and civil rights, 'TJ renders the continuity of socioeconomic dimensions of conflict irrelevant for the democratic legitimation of the new regime.' 96 Hugo van der Merwe reaches a similar conclusion:
This focus [on providing justice only for acts deemed to be politically motivated] effectively sidelines the more common economic or social abuses that generally occur in oppressive regimes -abuses that may well be the underlying reason for conflict over political power in the first place. 97 Millar, in one of the few evaluations to interrogate Sierra Leonean conceptions of justice, argues that:
The presentation of truth through public hearings had no discernible impact on the ability of such people to live a better life, whether now or in the future, and, therefore, was not experienced as providing a 'sense' of justice. 
[A]EVALUATING THE VALUE FRAMEWORK
At first sight, the value framework outlined above does not seem to have a great deal of utility.
Evaluations of Sierra Leonean TJ can be found in each category, and there is no agreement about the success or otherwise of the Sierra Leonean TJ programme (or even individual TJ mechanisms) from within value positions, let alone across them. 101 No one perspective is logically or obviously superior to others, meaning that the exercise of dividing up the scholarship according to value positions does not help us to reach any general conclusions in evaluating the case.
That said, the exercise does advance scholarship in a number of ways. The lack of agreement within any of the value positions is surprising, and helps to explain why TJ evaluation can be so frustrating a field for both scholars and practitioners. Even dividing research according to which of six different perspectives it most closely reflects does not resolve disagreements about whether TJ was a success in a case, which should be relatively straightforward to evaluate. Additionally, the exercise demonstrates that, despite a relatively significant amount of discussion within the conceptual literature on TJ on the different meanings of justice, the retributive/restorative/transformative distinction is rarely mentioned in evaluative work on TJ. Explicit consideration of intrinsic versus instrumental justification is also rare. Following Dancy's argument that comparison to an ideal is inherent to evaluation, the preceding analysis of the literature on Sierra Leone suggests that evaluators are not attentive to, or perhaps even aware of, the ideals that lie behind their judgements. 103 The study also confirms Vinjamuri and Snyder's observation that the justifications for TJ do not map neatly onto different professional or disciplinary identities. 104 Lawyers do not all justify TJ on the basis of legal principle, nor political scientists on the basis of consequences.
The variety of, and lack of attention to, value positions helps to explain why evaluations differ as widely as they do. Additionally, there is little systematic consideration in the 
